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An Essay on Organizational Citizenship Behavior

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This article advocates a more comprehensive understanding of job performance and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) than that employed by earlier researchers on those topics. Using the intellectual heritage of the word "citizenship" from political philosophy and related disciplines, OCB is positioned as the organizational equivalent of citizen responsibilities, of which there are three categories: obedience, loyalty, and political participation. Two other key citizenship concepts, relational ties and citizen rights, are described, and a set of ten research propositions is offered relating the citizenship concepts to one another. Suggestions for other areas of investigation are also provided. Finally, the advantages of using OCB as a global measure of individual behavior at work are defended.

KEY WORDS: organizational citizenship behavior; employee responsibilities; employee rights; covenants; relational ties.

INTRODUCTION

Nearly a decade ago a new construct was introduced into the organizational sciences: organizational citizenship behavior (OCB). In the earliest work (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983), OCB was defined by two criteria: (1) behavior above and beyond role requirements that is (2) organizationally functional. Research on altruism was commonly used to guide these early studies (e.g., Bateman & Organ, 1983; Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Miceli, 1986; Motowidlo, 1984; O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Smith, Organ & Near, 1983; Williams, Podsakoff & Huber, 1986). In the mid-1980s, Graham (1986a) suggested that the political dimension of the word "citizenship" be added to investigations of OCB. Citing Graham, Organ (1988) subsequently included "civic virtue" as a form of OCB in his book on the subject, but continued to define the overall OCB construct as organizationally functional, extrarole behavior. As shown in Table I, recent empirical studies (Motowidlo, Brief, Atieh, & Ashworth, 1987; Organ & Konofsky, 1989; Puffer, 1987; Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna, 1987)

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Table I. Overview of Previous OCB Studies

Study	Criteria used to define OCB			Categories or indices of OCB: Number in parentheses indicates more than one scale in category				
	Extra-role	No formal reward	Organizationally functional	Single scale	Interpersonal helping	Obedience	Loyalty	Participation
Bateman & Organ (1983)	x		x	x				
Smith, Organ, & Near (1983)	x		x		x	x		
Scholl & McKenna (1983)	x			x				
Motowidlo (1984)[a]					x			
Brief & Motowidlo (1986)[b]	x		x					
Miceli (1986)[c]				x				
Motowidlo, Packard & Manning (1986)	x				x	x		
O'Reilly & Chatman, #1 (1986)		x	x	x				
O'Reilly & Chatman, #2 (1986)	x		x	x				
Williams, Podsakoff, & Cooper (1986)	x		x		x	x(2)		
Graham (1986a)[d]					x	x	x	x
Motowidlo, Brief, Atieh, & Ashworth (1987)			x		x			
Puffer (1987)	x		x	x				
Scholl, Cooper, & McKenna (1987)	x			x				
Organ (1988)	x	x	x		x(2)	x	x	x
Organ & Konofsky (1989)	x		x		x	x		
Organ (1990)	x		x		x	x		

[a]No defining criteria are stated in this study. Instead a 3-item scale measuring "consideration" behaviors is used.

[b]This is a literature review of "prosocial organizational behavior" rather than an empirical study focused on OCB. It positions OCB as a form of prosocial organizational behavior that is extrarole and organizationally functional.

[c]This is a study where whistleblowing is used as an indicator of prosocial behavior. No defining criteria for OCB (or prosocial behavior) are specified. Because a single item was used to measure the dependent variable, it has been classified as a "single scale." Because of the nature of the behavior, however, whistleblowing is arguably an indicator of political participation as well (but certainly does not represent all such behavior).

[d]Rather than specifying defining criteria for OCB, this study used indices of good citizenship in non-organizational settings as a model for individual performance in the workplace.

continue to rely on variations of the original OCB formulation, although operationalizations of the construct vary.

A major shortcoming of defining a construct by its place in a 2 × 2 matrix — such as the one formed by in-role/extrarole and organizationally functional/dysfunctional behavior — is that its substantive content remains unspecified. The proliferation of OCB studies in the 1980s, for example, led to a variety of concepts that are uneven in terms of their logical clarity, ties to established literatures, and consistency with one another. Finding a substantive source for what constitutes citi-

zenship behavior would help resolve important construct validity problems so that future research on OCB might proceed.

This article builds on Graham's (1986a) OCB paper by choosing as a starting point the political heritage of citizenship, rather than the extrarole/organizationally functional defining criteria. In doing so, OCB is positioned not as a dependent variable separate from ordinary job performance, but as a global measure of individual behavior at work that includes traditional measures of job performance, the extrarole/organizationally functional behavior envisioned by the original OCB researchers, and also forms of political behavior that are accounted for nowhere else.

As a result, good citizenship is shown by above-average levels of a variety of substantive types of citizenship behavior, rather than by the presence or absence of job behaviors that are theoretically distinctive, but very difficult to classify. OCB as an inclusive performance construct offers a way to capture a variety of employee contributions, thereby minimizing the danger of neglecting important forms of service by defining performance too narrowly (Staw & Oldham, 1978).

The article is organized in three parts: Following an overview of the nature of political citizenship as it might be applied to organizational life, then research questions suggested by a political perspective are proposed, and finally the advantages of such a perspective, as compared to the original approach to OCB, are outlined.

PART 1: THE NATURE OF POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

In ordinary usage, citizenship describes the status of belonging somewhere, and it implies both rights and responsibilities. These three concepts are closely connected. The nature and strength of the ties that relate people to one another are affected by rights and responsibilities (and vice versa), and rights and responsibilities are themselves closely intertwined. Each of these concepts — relational ties, rights, and responsibilities — is examined in this part of the article from an interdisciplinary perspective. The first two sections are of interest in setting a context for the third, citizen responsibilities, for these responsibilities are synonymous with citizenship behaviors. In the last section, three categories of citizen responsibilities identified by political theorists are used to derive a substantive description of organizational citizenship behaviors.

Relational Ties

An interdisciplinary review offers organizational scholars numerous typologies for the purpose of characterizing the relational ties between individual members and their collectivities. For example, in her classic study of commitment and community, Kanter (1972, p. 148) discusses "two strains in social life":

> . . .*Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft.* Gemeinschaft relations include nonrational, affective, emotional, traditional, and expressive components of social action, as in a family; Gesellschaft relations comprise the rational, contractual, instrumental, and task-oriented actions, as in a business corporation.

While similar distinctions have been noted by others (Blau, 1964; Bromley & Busching, 1988; Buber, 1958; Gordon & Babchuk, 1959; Grover, 1982; MacNeil, 1985; Rousseau, 1989), extensions of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft have also been identified. Coercive relationships (Etzioni, 1975) are a special form of Gesellschaft relations, where some are obliged involuntarily to comply with terms set by others. Slave laborers exemplify coerced membership in an economic enterprise. Historically, slaves have been considered less than full citizens at best, or, more usually, mere subjects. As a result, their rights are severely limited. Those who are compelled to serve, moreover, lack the freedom to decide for themselves whether or not they will do their duty (as citizens), and so cannot be said to have responsibilities (Simmel, 1965).

While coercive relationships exemplify a diminished form of Gesellschaft relations, covenantal relationships are an enhanced form of Gemeinshaft relations (Buber, 1958). In addition to the affective ties among parties that typify Gemeinschaft relations (as in a family or a tightly knit work group), covenantal relationships include a moral dimension (Etzioni, 1988), the involvement of or shared commitment to a transcendent force, value, or principle of goodness. Whether this be a divine spark, "self-evident truths" (such as those enunciated in the Declaration of Independence), or superordinate group values underlying corporate culture, "covenants are articulated through a logic of moral involvement and unity" (Bromley & Busching, 1988, p. 16S). Shared moral commitments strengthen the ties that bind people together. Kelman's (1958) distinction between identification and internalization as bases for psychological attachment captures the difference between normal and covenantal Gemeinschaft relations. Significantly for the approach to OCB outlined in this article, some political theorists (Elazar, 1978, 1980; Hillers, 1969; Kincaid, 1980) have used the term "covenant" to describe the relational ties connecting citizens and their nation-states.

Covenantal relationships are characterized by what Barber (1983, p. 14) describes as ". . . the expectation that some others in our social relationships have moral obligations and responsibility to demonstrate a special concern for other's interests above their own." The details of what will be required to maintain the relationship and support shared values, however, are not specifiable in advance. A covenant "is not a bargain but a pledge" (Rowley, 1962, p. 1515), and is characterized by mutual respect, support, and accountability.

Max DePree, CEO at Herman Miller Co., observes that

> Covenantal relationships reflect unity and grace and poise. They are an expression of the sacred nature of relationships. [They] enable corporations to be hospitable to the unusual person and unusual ideas. Covenantal relationships tolerate risk and forgive errors. (DePree, 1989, p. 51)

While the parties to a covenantal relationship can forgive one another should disappointing performance occasionally occur, a contractual relationship (Gesellschaft) is either terminated or penalties are assessed on the erring performer (Grover, 1982). As noted by Daniel Elazar (1980, p. 10), "The partners [in a covenantal relationship] do not automatically live happily ever after, but they are bound by covenant to struggle toward such an end."

This emphasis on struggle is important. Covenantal relationships are not conflict-free. Nor is docility in the face of conflict a necessary (or even helpful) response. Instead, the mutual trust typical of covenantal ties allows members sufficient confidence in their status as permanent partners to release the energy needed for experimentation and progress during difficult times, with space for disagreement, mistakes, forgiveness, and mutual learning. Ordinary measures of task performance at work do not recognize these forms of contribution.

In a review of political citizenship concepts, it is important to recognize covenantal relationships as a special status of belonging because it is the strongest form of social bond. Restricting attention to relational ties based on instrumental Gesellschaft relations, on the one hand, and normal Gemeinschaft relations, on the other, risks overlooking distinctive categories of citizenship rights and responsibilities that come into play when social bonds are very strong. Varieties of citizen rights and responsibilities are explored in the next two sections.

Citizenship Rights

Citizens have rights that are not available to noncitizens. The substance of these rights varies with time and place, and may also vary across groups of citizens. That is, some citizens may have more rights than other citizens at any point in time, and these differences may affect the nature of the ties that bind citizens to one another. As a result, the substance and distribution of rights are important matters to understand about a geopolitical entity (e.g., nation, state, local community), and about an organization (Keeley, 1988; Rousseau & Anton, 1988).

T. H. Marshall (1965), in reviewing three centuries of English history to explain the extension of citizens' rights to an ever broader share of the population, identified three categories of rights: *civil* (legal protection of life, liberty, and property), *political* (participation in decision-making), and *social* (adequate level of socioeconomic benefits). In England, civil, political, and social rights developed in an interrelated historical sequence. Basic civil rights were the moral underpinning of English common law. Those without rights of political participation, however, depended on the good will of those in power to administer justly. To secure justice under the law (and the passage of just laws), the franchise was sought and gradually extended to more and more of the populace. Similarly, those with inferior education and an inadequate standard of living were at a disadvantage in utilizing their civil and political rights. A gradual expansion of social rights resulted, due to a combination of the beneficence of the "haves" and the demands of the "have-nots."

Marshall's (1965) categorization of civil, political, and social rights can be used to analyze organizations as well as societies. Organizational civil rights would include fair treatment in routine personnel matters (hiring, assignment, evaluation, etc.), and also guarantees of due process when problems arise (e.g., grievance investigation and disciplinary proceedings). Political rights would include the ability to participate in decision making both about current operational matters, and about broader organizational policies, objectives, and spending plans. Social rights would

include economic benefits (regular salary/ wages, bonuses, insurance, pensions, etc.), social status symbols, and training/educational opportunities.

Organizational rights distinguish members from nonmembers. Given the hierarchical structure typical of most organizations, however, unequal rights within organizations are not only possible but likely. For researchers, this fact has two implications: (1) suitable research sites (i.e., those where sufficient variance exists to allow for statistical analysis) will not be difficult to find; and (2) the nature and extent of unequal rights, as a variable in its own right, may be related to members' relational ties and OCB.

Citizenship Responsibilities

In this article, the terms "citizenship behaviors" and "citizen responsibilities" are synonymous. Specifying the responsibilities of citizens in a geopolitical arena can therefore be used as a guide to identifying organizational citizenship behaviors. Three categories of citizen responsibilities are revealed in a review of classical philosophy and modern political theory (Aristotle, 1941; Cary, 1977; Inkeles, 1969; Janowitz, 1980, 1984; Lane, 1965; Pateman, 1970; Plato, 1892; Rossiter, 1950; Salkever, 1974; Tussman, 1960; Walzer, 1970; Wolin, 1960). Each category focuses on a different facet of the interrelationship citizens have with one another and their nation/state/community.

Obedience. The first category is respect for orderly structures and processes. Citizens are responsible for obeying existing laws and they are also protected by them. For example, laws may require that citizens pay taxes, drive on a designated side of the road, refrain from violating others' rights, and at times even risk their lives in military service.

Loyalty. The second category of citizen responsibilities concerns the expansion of individual welfare functions to include the interests of others, the state as a whole, and the values it embodies. Citizenship behaviors in this category include uncompensated contributions of effort, money, or property; protecting and/or enhancing a state's good reputation in the eyes of outsiders; and cooperating with others to serve the common interest, rather than seeking a free ride.

Participation. The third category of citizen responsibilities concerns participation in governance. Aristotle (1941, p. 1181) emphasized that "Men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both." Citizens-as-rulers assist in implementing the law (e.g., by holding or electing others to executive positions), and in adjudicating violations of it (e.g., by serving on juries). They also participate (directly or through elected representatives) in changing laws to respond to new facts and evolving understandings of the common interest. As a result, citizenship behavior includes devoting time and effort to the responsibilities of governance, keeping well informed, sharing information and ideas with others, engaging in discussions about controversial issues, voting in whatever manner is provided under the law, and encouraging others to do likewise.

The three categories of citizen responsibilities described above — obedience, loyalty, and participation — although developed to describe citizenship in a geopolitical arena, also can be used in organizational settings. To illustrate, Inkeles' (1969, pp. 1122-1123) summary descriptions of the three terms (derived from his comparative political studies) are paraphrased (and possible indicators provided) as follows:

Organizational Obedience. An orientation toward organizational structure, job descriptions, and personnel policies that recognizes and accepts the necessity and desirability of a rational structure of rules and regulations. Obedience may be demonstrated by respect for rules and instructions, punctuality in attendance and task completion, and stewardship of organizational resources.

Organizational Loyalty. Identification with and allegiance to organizational leaders and the organization as a whole, transcending the parochial interests of individuals, work groups, and departments. Representative behaviors include defending the organization against threats; contributing to its good reputation; and cooperating with others to serve the interests of the whole.

Organizational Participation. Interest in organizational affairs guided by ideal standards of virtue, validated by keeping informed, and expressed through full and responsible involvement in organizational governance. This includes attending nonrequired meetings, sharing informed opinions and new ideas with others, and being willing to deliver bad news or support an unpopular view to combat groupthink.

Responsible citizenship requires a balance of obedience, loyalty, and participation, rather than focusing on one at the expense of the others. Consider the variety of ways citizens can be *ir*responsible: (1) One who obeys the letter of the law, but neither feels allegiance to the common good nor participates in governance, is indistinguishable from a resident alien or day laborer. (2) The loyal flag-waver who privately flouts the law for personal gain is a hypocrite, as is the nostalgic patriot who ignores emerging issues and refuses to participate in the political process to address them constructively, thereby allowing threats to the long-term viability of the state or organization to fester. (3) The political activist who disrespects existing political structures and processes, or who pursues parochial interests to the detriment of the long-term common good, is an anarchist.

Table II summarizes the various forms of belonging, citizen rights, and citizen responsibilities discussed in Part 1 of this article. Translating this descriptive table into a set of research propositions is the subject of Part 2.

PART 2: RESEARCH QUESTIONS

If, in ordinary usage, citizenship describes the status of belonging somewhere, and implies both rights and responsibilities, is the same true for organizational citizenship? This question guides the development of a theoretical model of OCB which, in turn, leads to testable research propositions.

Table II. Summary of Citizenship Concepts as Applied to Organizations

Status of belonging (ordered by strength of relational ties)	Typology of organizational rights	Typology of organizational responsibilities
Coercion, e.g., slaves	None	Avoid punishment
Gesellschaft relations, e.g., casual labor having no affective ties to the organization, but who work entirely for the instrumental rewards to be earned from employment	Organizational civil rights, e.g., fair treatment in routine personnel matters such as hiring, job assignments, transfers, promotions, and layoffs; due process in disciplinary and discharge proceedings, grievance filings, and complaint investigation	Organizational obedience, i.e., an orientation toward organizational structure, job descriptions, and personnel policies that recognizes and accepts the necessity and desirability of a rational structure of rules and regulations
Gemeinschaft relations, e.g., longer-term employees who are part of friendship networks in the organization, and have come to identify with it as a whole, including its products and its leadership	Organizational social rights, e.g., claims to economic resources in the form of wage and salary income, bonuses, current fringe benefits, and pension contributions; social status symbols such as office size and location, private dining facilities, etc.	Organizational loyalty, i.e., identification with and allegiance to organizational leaders and the organization as a whole, transcending the parochial interests of individuals, work groups, and departments
Covenantal relations, a special form of Gemeinschaft that includes transcendent principles of goodness (e.g., equal rights for all persons) that inspire and support the parties to the relationship, and to which they are held accountable	Organizational political rights, e.g., ability to influence, participate in, or make decisions concerning organizational policies and practices ranging from the details of doing one task to the mission of the organization as a whole, from issues of finance to personnel, operations to marketing	Organizational participation, i.e., interest in organizational affairs guided by ideal standards of virtue, validated by keeping informed, and expressed through full and responsible involvement in organizational governance

The Major Variables and How They Change

Before proposing relationships among the organizational citizenship variables — i.e., relational ties, rights, and responsibilities — it is necessary to establish, if possible, the directionality of each one. Each was presented in Part 1 as a typology or set of categories. Can these categorical variables be transformed into continuous or, at least, ordinal ones? The nature and intensity of relational ties comes closest to meeting that test. While discontinuities may exist owing to changes in the substantive character of a relationship, it is nonetheless true that the strength of relational ties is likely to increase as one moves from coercion to Gesellschaft, thence to Gemeinschaft, and finally to covenantal relations.

Selecting a ranking criterion for organizational citizen rights is less obvious. While it is possible to conceive of "more or less" of any given kind of right (e.g., civil, social, or political), claiming that one kind represents more rights than another depends on the value attached to what is gained or lost. Consider, for example, power versus wealth. To some extent having one helps in acquiring the other, but a chicken-and-egg problem persists nonetheless.

A similar difficulty is encountered in ranking the categories of OCB. For example, consider as potential ranking criteria the values of convenience and courage. Obedience and loyalty are likely to be more convenient for management than participation, since the latter may challenge existing power structures and decisions, while the former are likely to reflect uncritical enthusiasm for things as they are. Loyalty and participation, on the other hand, are likely to require more courage than obedience, in the sense that they may initiate or be responsive to criticism of the organization. Recalling Aristotle's claim that good citizenship is demonstrated by an ability to rule *and* to be ruled, selection of managerial convenience over courage (or vice versa) as a single ranking criterion is difficult to justify.

In sum, of the organizational citizenship concepts described in this article as relational ties, rights, and responsibilities, only the first appears to have the properties of an ordinal variable. The various citizen rights and responsibilities are categorical variables, although within each category increases and decreases are meaningful. With that established, discussion of a model may proceed.

The Geopolitical Environment

An important contextual factor when discussing organizational citizenship is that organizations are embedded in geopolitical units (e.g., nation-states) having their own distinctive traditions regarding citizenship (cf. Scott, 1988). This fact sets constraints on what an organization can do. For example, where slavery is outlawed, organizations cannot legally coerce members to belong. Further, where employees have the right to quit (a civil right guaranteed in this example by the state), employers find themselves obliged to offer acceptable intraorganizational rights (e.g., fair treatment, competitive wages, and a voice in decisions affecting employee interests) in order to induce employees to join and stay in the organization.

In addition to protecting civil rights (such as employment-at-will), the state may also guarantee social rights (such as minimum hourly wage rates and pension protection), and political rights (such as union organization and representation). The point of these examples is that rights exist at two levels: the geopolitical environment and the organization. If an organization violates individual rights guaranteed by the state, organizational members have recourse to the state's legal system, i.e., to exercise their societal civil rights to force the organization to come into compliance.

The fact of organizational embeddedness in larger geopolitical systems not only sets a floor for organizational rights; it also suggests as a variable of interest the degree to which organizational rights exceed those required by the state. This factor is likely to affect members' relational ties with an organization, as illustrated in Fig. 1. Where organizational policies and practices are minimally congruent with legal requirements, instrumental relationships are likely, as are low levels of OCB. Conversely, as organizational policies and practices regarding members' rights become more generous than a state requires, members' relational ties to an organization are likely to become stronger, and higher levels of OCB are predicted. Insofar as rights available to various groups of citizen-members are not equal, both



Fig. 1. OCB, relational ties to the organization, and a comparison of societal and organizational rights.

these patterns of relationships (and many in between) can co-exist within the same organization. A general statement of the relationships among rights, relational ties, and levels of OCB, as a function of comparative citizen rights conferred by an organization and those mandated by the state, is summarized in the following propositions:

Proposition 1. Organizational policies and practices granting more member rights than those required by the geopolitical environment strengthen the relational ties member-citizens have with their organizations.

Proposition 2. As strength of relational ties increases, so do all forms of OCB.

In addition to the general relationships described in Propositions 1 and 2, links between specific types of relational ties, rights, and responsibilities are also possible. Because the focus of this article is on OCB, citizen responsibilities are designated as the dependent variables of primary interest, although feedback loops are also suggested.

The basic argument, as shown in Figs. 2a-2c, is that each category of citizen rights is matched with a category of citizen responsibilities, and that each pairing is moderated by the nature of the relational ties members have with their organizations. These connections augment the relationships described in Propositions 1 and 2, wherein generous rights were predicted to strengthen relational ties, and strength of relational ties was predicted to have a direct impact on all forms of OCB.

Organizational Obedience

In Fig. 2a, organizational civil rights are matched with organizational obedience. Civil rights at an organizational level concern guarantees against unfair treatment in hiring, promotions, discipline and grievance procedures, etc., these being roughly equivalent to protection of life, liberty, and property at a societal level. Because one person's rights imply an obligation on the part of others to respect



Fig. 2. Types of OCB as a function of types of member-citizen rights and relational ties to an organization.

those rights (Keeley, 1988), organizational civil rights are plausibly coupled with the responsibility to respect the order provided by fair employment practices, i.e., not to seek favored treatment, or to bend the rules. Respect for order is an example of the category of OCB termed organizational obedience.

While there is a logical association between organizational civil rights and obedience, the impact of civil rights on OCB is likely to be affected by the nature of the relationship a member has with an organization. Those with Gesellschaft relational ties are likely to be minimally compliant, because they see rights and responsibilities related only instrumentally. On the other hand, those with normal or covenantal Gemeinschaft relational ties are likely to obey the spirit as well as the letter of the law, due to their sincere respect for organizational rationality. Propositions 3 and 4 describe the relationships pictured in Fig. 2a.

Proposition 3. As organizational civil rights increase, so does organizational obedience.

Proposition 4. The direct relationship between organizational civil rights and obedience is enhanced as relational ties to the organization are stronger.

Organizational Loyalty

In Fig. 2b, organizational social rights are shown paired with organizational loyalty. The logic underlying this proposition is that those for whom an organization guarantees greater socioeconomic benefits are most likely to return the favor, that is, to engage in behavior that protects the organization, enhances its reputation, and serves the whole rather than the parochial interests of specific parts. As with civil rights and obedience, the linkage of social rights and loyalty is likely to be moderated by the nature and strength of the ties that link members to their organization. Those with Gesellschaft relational ties, for example, may tell outsiders that their employer's generous benefits package is a really good deal, as if the employees' cleverness was responsible for their good fortune. Those with normal or covenantal Gemeinschaft relational ties with the organization, on the other hand, would attribute the generous package to the virtues of the employer, thereby enhancing its reputation rather than their own. Propositions 5 and 6 describe the relationships pictured in Fig. 2b.

Proposition 5. As organizational social rights increase, so does organizational loyalty.

Proposition 6. The direct relationship between organizational social rights and loyalty is enhanced as relational ties to the organization are stronger.

An alternative starting point for considering the citizenship concepts of social rights, organizational loyalty, and relational ties is also possible. By definition, member-citizens having normal or covenantal Gemeinschaft relational ties with an organization (but not Gesellschaft relations) identify with the group as a whole and feel allied with its other members (especially in comparison with nonmembers). A plausible result of these affective ties is to sensitize members to the needs of their compatriots, and incline them to share their own resources so that the basic needs of all are met. From this perspective, strong relational ties lead to interpersonal helping. Such prosocial behavior might qualify as organizational loyalty, if one assumes that the group as a whole would be better off if some forgo their personal interests to help others.

A more limited definition of organizational loyalty, however, is implied by the work of the political theorists described in Part 1 of this article. It restricts the target of helping behavior to the organization as a whole, or its official representatives (e.g., representing the organization favorably to outsiders, protecting it from threats, etc.). From this perspective, instances of generosity directed at individuals would qualify as consideration (Motowidlo, 1984), altruism (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983), or some other form of prosocial organizational behavior (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986), but not as OCB. In Fig. 2b, a second dependent variable is pictured, termed interpersonal helping. Proposition 7 describes the additional relationship predicted by starting from relational ties rather than from citizens' social rights.

Proposition 7. Strong relational ties to the organization are associated with an increase in interpersonal helping behavior directed at others in the organization.

Organizational Participation

Finally, in Fig. 2c, organizational political rights are linked to organizational participation. In one sense this statement is tautological: those at high job levels, for example, have both the right and responsibility to participate in making decisions. The exercise of decision-making power, however, is not OCB unless it is guided by ideal standards of virtue and is exercised responsibly. As a result, domination alone, even if legitimized by an authority structure, does not qualify automatically as good citizenship. Furthermore, given the many forms participation can take (Cotton, Vollrath, Froggatt, Lengnick-Hall, & Jennings, 1988), and the many steps in a decision-making process (Vroom & Yetton, 1973), the issue facing a member-citizen, regardless of job level, is whether or not to participate as fully as his/her rights will allow (Janowitz, 1980, 1984; Rossiter, 1950).

As with the other forms of citizen rights and responsibilities, it is the nature and strength of relational ties that predicts a member-citizen's response to this challenge. Those having only an instrumental relationship with an organization are likely to be politically apathetic, except about issues having a direct impact on their own welfare (more on this situation follows). Even those having normal Gemeinschaft relations, who identify with an organization and its leaders, are likely to be inactive, although their reason is not apathy but uncritical acceptance of whatever organizational leaders decide. It is those with covenantal relational ties who are likely to be responsible political activists, protecting and advancing the principles that helped to form a covenant in the first place. If those principles need to be revised in response to changing environmental conditions, then covenantal members will try to participate in designing and endorsing any change, so that covenantal relational ties are maintained. It was to highlight this unique contribution of covenantal members that a distinction between normal and covenantal Gemeinschaft relations was introduced earlier in the article. Propositions 8 and 9 describe these relationships:

Proposition 8. As organizational political rights increase, so does organizational participation.

Proposition 9. The direct relationship between organizational political rights and participation is enhanced if relational ties to the organization are covenantal in character.

Given the modern understanding of the word "political" as self-serving, even devious behavior, the more positive connotations implied here may need explication. For Greek philosophers, "political" described the activities of professional public servants, i.e., those dedicated to serve the *polis* or community interest. Adapting the classical perspective to an organizational level (at least for the sake of argument) implies that those with political rights share a calling to serve the common good.

It will quickly be argued that, in the 1990s, "political" no longer has the idealistic associations alleged by classical philosophers. Perhaps not. But the moderating relationship depicted in Fig. 2c allows for precisely that contingency. Those who are committed to a transcendent principle or organizing value, i.e., those having a covenantal relationship with an organization, are likely to use their political rights to pursue the common good rather than to further narrow partisan interests. With this model, by simultaneously holding political rights constant and assessing the effect on organizational participation of strength of relational ties, it is feasible to distinguish between political activity that is a form of responsible organizational citizenship, and that which is not. The question of whether political participation by those with greater organizational power is more likely to qualify as OCB than the political activities of lower ranking member-citizens could be investigated.

It is important to note that this good citizenship test does not require universal agreement. Covenantal relationships do not imply an absence of conflict about specific issues. What is implied, however, is that the civil, social, and political rights of others, together with the principles upon which they are based, are not jeopardized in an effort by some to impose their preferences on others. Instead, when conflicts arise they are resolved through processes of cooperation, negotiation, and compromise.

Finally, many kinds of participation in decision-making, while not always increasing traditional measures of job performance, generally are related to job satisfaction and organizational commitment (Locke & Schweiger, 1979; Miller & Monge, 1986; Cotton et al., 1988). It is likely, therefore, that political participation will strengthen the relational ties member-citizens have with their organizations, as shown in the feedback arrow in Fig. 2c and described by Proposition 10:

Proposition 10. Organizational participation (as a form of OCB) strengthens relational ties with the organization.

Exogenous Factors

The relationships pictured in Figs. 2a-2c concern only the interrelationships of the citizenship variables: relational ties, rights and responsibilities. It is not intended to suggest that no other factors are involved. The remainder of this part of the article considers three categories of exogenous factors — environmental, organizational, and personal factors — likely to influence the various citizenship variables. Because the focus of the article is on those citizenship variables, however, research propositions are formulated only for them. The factors discussed below would need to be "held constant" in order to test the ten propositions described earlier.

Environmental Factors

In addition to setting norms for citizen rights that organizations must meet or exceed (as discussed above in conjunction with Propositions 1 and 2), environmental factors are also likely to affect individual choices concerning relational ties

and citizen responsibilities. For example, cultural traditions or popular beliefs concerning human nature may predispose people to form or not to form covenantal relationships. An illustration close to home for academics is comparing the covenantal inclinations of students who have just taken their first course in microeconomics (or behavioral psychology) to those who have recently studied poetry or moral philosophy .One suspects the special issue of *Organization Science* (forthcoming) devoted to "The Litigious Organization" is more apt to describe the choices of the former than the latter group of students.

The time horizon valued by the larger culture is also likely to affect individual choices. In some cultures, the merits of particular actions are assessed in terms of their effects on following generations, while others focus on quarterly results, the next election, or some other short-term measure. Culture affects the extent to which long-term future outcomes are either emphasized or discounted.

The nature and extent of political participation in organizations may be modeled after the sociopolitical culture in which an organization exists. This has implications for the management of multinational businesses, as well as for comparative organizational analyses across national/cultural boundaries. Consider the Western democracies in comparison to parts of the world that only recently have thrown off the yoke of imperialism or totalitarian regimes. While political scientists have studied comparative political systems for decades (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Cary, 1977; Inkeles, 1969; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978; Wolin, 1960), the connection between those systems and OCB awaits investigation.

Organizational Factors

Many organizational characteristics (in addition to organizational civil, social, and political rights) are likely to affect both citizen-members' relational ties and their responsibilities. The culture internal to an organization may vary in the same ways as the larger environment, and with similar results. Prevailing assumptions about basic human nature may create an atmosphere that is either hospitable or hostile to the formation of covenantal relationships in a workplace. A long-term versus short-term planning horizon may have similar effects. Norms concerning participation in governance are likely to affect members' sense of ownership and involvement, factors likely to influence both the intensity of relational ties and feelings of responsibility to participate constructively in organizational governance. In addition, the trustworthiness of management may affect member-citizens' relational ties to an organization. Where there is a history of labor-management strife, instrumental Gesellschaft relations are likely to predominate. Finally, specific job descriptions and associated incentive systems are likely to encourage or discourage specific forms of OCB.

Personal Factors

Personal attitudes, beliefs, and life experiences are likely to influence individual member-citizens' propensity to form strong relational ties with an organization.

Job satisfaction with supervision and co-workers is plausibly linked with the creation and maintenance of normal Gemeinschaft relations, but probably not covenantal ones unless shared values elevate the relationships to a higher level. Organizational commitment (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982) is a more likely predictor of covenantal relations, especially if member-citizens perceive a return commitment from the organization, as shown by job security and trustworthy management.

Personal disposition to trust others, in addition to being affected by environmental and organizational traditions, is also likely to be influenced by an individual's prior experience with close relationships. Years of abusive or coldly calculating relationships at work, school, or even with family and friends, are likely to orient member-citizens toward weak relational ties.

Finally, stage of moral development is likely to influence an individual's choice of time horizon and the composition of his/her welfare function. Those at earlier stages are focused on near-term results for themselves; those at later stages are concerned about long-term results for many. As a result, stage of moral development is likely to predict personal inclination both to form covenantal relationships, and to engage in courageous behaviors that are rational only when viewed from afar.

PART 3: ADVANTAGES OF A POLITICAL APPROACH TO OCB

Concerns about the adequacy of the dependent variables traditionally studied in organizational behavior have been expressed for at least a decade (Staw & Oldham, 1978). A promising line of research that emerged in response was organizational citizenship behavior. One way of comparing different understandings of OCB, then, is by clarifying the relationship each has with traditional measures of individual behavior at work. Another basis for comparison is OCB's explanatory value in accounting for how members respond to organizational change. In this part of the paper, the distinctive qualities of a political approach to OCB are explored by addressing those two questions.

Why Add OCB as a New Dependent Variable?

To compare different understandings of OCB, it is helpful to state why the concept is of interest in the first place, since the justifications for studying OCB vary in a fundamental way. In brief, the political perspective proposes that the citizen responsibilities of obedience, loyalty, and participation encompass *all* forms of individual behavior at work, while the original OCB researchers (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983; Organ & Konofsky, 1989; Organ, 1988; Organ, 1990) seek only to fill in gaps left by traditional job performance measures.

While more modest in aspiration, the original approach to OCB has proved very difficult to accomplish. Conceptually the behaviors have been positioned as examples of Katz and Kahn's (1978, p. 403) third category of "patterns of individual behavior required for organizational functioning and effectiveness." As such, it is critical that the new behaviors be shown to meet Katz and Kahn's (1978, p. 403)

criteria for category 3: "behavior that is extrarole and organizationally functional." This has proven to be a difficult task on both counts.

To meet the first criterion, the new OCB behaviors must be differentiated clearly from those in Katz and Kahn's (1978) categories 1 and 2, i.e., dependable organizational participation (e.g., attendance) and task performance (e.g., productivity). Given the multiplicity and complexity of role messages derived from written job descriptions, verbal instructions, and the informal role expectations of supervisors (perhaps at multiple levels), co-workers, subordinates, customers, and even the job itself, it is possible (even likely) that there will be conflicts among them (Tsui, 1984). Without taking sides in such a conflict, there is no way for scholars to resolve it in order to draw an unambiguous line between in-role and extrarole behavior, even for one job at one point in time. Further, since messages sent by role-senders change over time, generalizing across time, not to mention across jobs and organizational settings, only compounds the problem.

The second criterion, organizational functionality, is complicated because an employee's intention to help the organization does not guarantee that the result is actually beneficial in the way intended. In addition, interested observers may disagree about what is organizationally functional in a specific instance, or about the time horizon over which organizational impact should be calculated. An employee may intend to help the organization, for example, and believe that his/her behavior does so (at least in the long run), but others may not agree that the effect is beneficial (at least in the short run). An example of such controversial behavior is whistleblowing (Miceli, 1986; Near & Miceli, 1987) or, more generally, principled organizational dissent: " . . . the effort by individuals in the workplace to protest and/or to change the organizational status quo because of their conscientious objection to current policy or practice" (Graham, 1986b, p. 2). Whether principled dissent, on the one hand, or unchallenged organizational actions of dubious ethical status, on the other, is most functional for the organization, is difficult for neutral observers to determine.

Organizational citizenship behavior seen from the perspective of the political heritage of the word "citizenship," in contrast to the original formulation of OCB, does not face the challenges posed by specifying behavior that is unequivocably extrarole and organizationally functional. Instead, it provides a global framework for identifying and measuring all forms of individual behavior in the workplace. Traditional measures of performance (e.g., quantity and quality of production) and of physical participation (e.g., absenteeism and turnover) are included within the obedience-loyalty-participation framework, with the expectation that high performance may be due to strong relational ties and secure citizen rights, as well as to organizational incentives and/or job instructions. Beyond the traditional measures, however, additional forms of behavior, modeled after citizenship responsibilities in a geopolitical arena, are also included in the framework. A key defining criterion is that the behavior support transcendent values that help to form covenantal relations. For example, the conduct of employees devoted to principles such as the frugal use of resources, the dignity of all persons, and ethical business practices may exceed what current organizational incentives can account for. The generosity engendered by covenantal ties explains their extra effort. Traditional measures of

job performance overlook these contributions, which may be vital to organizational revitalization and renewal.

These additional citizenship behaviors also reflect a time horizon different from Smith et al.'s (1983) indicators of OCB, which focus on short-term forms of citizenship: being there on time, industry on the job, helping someone in need of immediate assistance, etc. The two additional forms of OCB proposed here — participation and loyalty — have longer-term effects. Participation may help the organization adapt to its environment in ways that enhance organizational success, and exercise/enhance participants' participatory skills. Loyalty builds support for the organization among important external constituency groups.

A political approach to OCB therefore includes traditional measures of job performance, the extrarole, organizationally functional behaviors envisioned by the original OCB researchers, and also forms of principled behavior that are accounted for nowhere else. The most controversial of these is likely to be responsible political participation. The next section examines this issue in more detail.

How Do Citizens Respond to Change?

A second way to compare the different approaches to OCB is in terms of their explanatory value concerning citizens' response to changing conditions, especially undesirable change. A political approach to OCB offers an additional option not present in earlier treatments of OCB (Bateman & Organ, 1983; Organ, 1988, 1990; Organ & Konofsky, 1989; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983) that are based on Blau's (1964) two-category model of relational ties. Because of its inclusion of covenantal ties, a political model of OCB also allows for political participation (balanced by respect for orderly structures and a concern for the organization as a whole, i.e., obedience and loyalty) as a response to undesirable change.

Let us examine this contrast in greater detail. Organ's (1988, 1990) "good soldier" organizational citizens are disposed to be obedient and cooperative at work. Unless and until they feel their good will and good works are being exploited by an unjust employer, they are inclined to work conscientiously, be courteous and helpful to others, and patiently endure temporary inconveniences. Nevertheless, Organ argues, these soldiers have a trigger point. When and if a "good soldier" citizen decides an employer is unjust, "Disconfirmation of fairness in social exchange is accompanied by dissatisfaction . . . and prompts a redefinition of the relationship as one of economic exchange" (Organ, 1990, p. 66). Once the relationship is redefined in that way, cost-benefit calculations can be anticipated, and employees may leave the employer for another one.

Voluntary turnover of the sort predicted by Organ (1990) is an example of exit, as the economist Hirschman uses the term (1970). But Hirschman also identifies another type of response to dissatisfaction which Organ's scenario overlooks: voice. Instead of abandoning their declining organization, it is plausible that employees who have felt themselves to be in covenantal relationship with it will try to work from within to repair a deteriorating situation. In a political model of citizenship behavior, such a response, without denying the importance of conscien-

tiousness and goodwill, is also a form of OCB. By taking the initiative, member-citizens can try to change the situation for the better, e.g., to influence the organization to be more just or efficient. Staw and Boettger's (1990) experimental efforts to induce "task revision" is a recent example of the latter.

Participation (voice), although neglected in earlier studies, is not a trivial or residual form of OCB. First, it implies a psychological attachment to the organization that is stronger than normal Gemeinschaft relations (Kanter, 1972) or social exchange (Blau, 1964); instead the tie is covenantal in nature. Second, it requires maintenance of a state of critical awareness, sensitivity to issues of principle, and a willingness to engage others, even if doing so risks disrupting the calm routine of organizational life. This does not imply enjoyment of disruptive behavior. The anguish of raising objections and advocating change is likely to be felt more intensely by an organizational citizen taking the initiative (at least if such a person is disposed to be a cooperative team member) than by anyone else. Yet without such effort, such moral courage (Moore, 1978), all sorts of evil has been (and continues to be) done under the excuse "I was only following orders." It is an essential premise of this article that following unethical orders exemplifies poor citizenship at every level.

In systems valuing orderliness and efficient operations, the disruption and delay occasioned by dissent are almost surely inconvenient. Existing power systems may also be challenged, and therein lies the controversy. While sidestepping these issues by ignoring political participation as a category of citizenship behavior results in a picture of OCB that is extremely pleasant, it is nonetheless flawed as a result.

CONCLUSION

A political approach to organizational citizenship, in contrast to the original model proposed by Bateman and Organ (1983) and Smith *et al.* (1983), uses OCB as a global term describing all organizationally relevant individual behavior. This approach has several advantages. From a practical standpoint, it frees researchers from declaring what is or is not organizationally functional, and having to draw a clean line between in-role and extrarole behavior. Conceptually, because of the fortunate choice by Organ and his early colleagues of the term "citizenship" to describe the behavior they were studying, the intellectual heritage of citizenship research in philosophy, political science, and social history can be used to identify specific substantive categories of citizen rights and responsibilities. The important role played by the nature and strength of relational ties is also emphasized.

Finally, by enlarging the scope of the major individual performance variable studied by organizational scientists, i.e., by replacing traditional job performance measures with OCB, future research and practice might pay greater heed to organizational citizen rights and relational ties when trying to understand individual performance. Research studies which ignore important citizenship variables — including short-term laboratory studies where there is insufficient time for variation in relational ties to develop and, by default, citizen rights are limited to the ones research subjects have as societal citizens — such studies are likely to explain only a small amount of an inclusive measure of individual performance. Perhaps relational ties

at work are usually assumed to be instrumental (Gesellschaft) because so much research is conducted in laboratory settings where no other sorts of relationships have time to develop! To explore the model of OCB outlined in this article, field studies in real work settings, where there is variation in rights and relational ties (as well as in predictor variables studied in the lab) are strongly recommended.

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